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More people than ever before are speculating nowadays about the nature of Europe, its culture, its
society, its political constitution, its prospects and destiny. It is. in a way, a thankless endeavour. for when
people begin to theorise about the possible (essence,, of a given society (or its culture) we may he fairly
sure that something in it is either already gone or in serious danger of going. That seems to he the case
with that entity which we all appear to cherish but cannot define very well: Europe. It is an entity which
happens to constitute, for many of our citizens, the widest possible frame of reference, lying beyond lo-
cality, occupation and nation, as the true source of whatever they seem to have been able to learn in terms
of education, taste, ethics and public and even private conduct.
Our current search for the precise features of European society is at the core of the very plight which
confronts that society, its policy and its culture. It is also part of a contemporary obsession with (iden-
tity,. over recent decades, the search for identity (for roots, uniqueness. distinctiveness) has become one
of the central themes of the age, both here and abroad; that is. beyond the confines of Europe. The search
for identity is a theme. a preoccupation, that has invaded and coloured all Our speculations about Europe,
including, first and foremost, our often unexpressed anxieties and fears about its future at this crucial mo-
ment of its modern history. Yet we ought to know better in this respect: a relentless search for identity, as
such, leads nowhere. It is the quintessential task of Sisyphus. Roots and Ultimate identities must be left
where they belong, in the realm of mystery, else we must see then) used and abused by ideologies, natio-
nalist or otherwise. Identity is averse to rational analysis, though religion, art and poetry may sometimes
convey it superbly.
The endemic difficulties of any search for identity have been compounded by the fact, in Europe's
case, of its own projection upon the rest of the world. The massive world expansion of our culture, carried
to every corner of the Faith by a handful of seaborne Western-European empires, by the Russian empire
towards the East and then by the United States from its North-American home everywhere has, paradoxi-
cally. undermined its uniqueness, its identity and its roots. Moreover, recent cosmogonies and philosop-
hies of history that soniehow told the story of our core traditions and claimed to foretell their future and
destiny have either been disgraced or considerably discredited. There seems no way of reconstructing it
comparable way of looking at world history any longer. It looks as though any interpretations of the same
ilk that may dare to appear will he given short shrift by most Os us. General futuristic conceptions (in the
past nearly always likened to vast cosmogonies and philosophies of history) have also been discredited,
though, on a practical level, Europeans, like all Westerners and all peoples having ass intilated our classi-
cal political formulas, still continue to he futuristic. With due caution, futurism is Our eery condition as
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animals of IIIodcrnItelonomist,. pohliciauts, ii lush alists. cducator,, ecologists, physiciants. architects,
Scientists. must all «plan ahead". It is the legacy of that powerful belief in progress that has characterised
one crucial and easily identifiable component of our culture since the dawn of Enlightenment up until yes-
terday. Such faith niay have all but disappeared in its original form, but it has left its with a need (or a
compulsion) to plan the time ahead. it has left us the imperative to he futuristic. It is, however, a residual
futurism. We are futurists without it grand design.
Perhaps some of you will think that, if no particular identity can he established, we can at least agree
that, looking hack on our common history (both in the distant past and during recent times, including con-
temporary events and the rise, at long last, of a united Europe) we do possess a considerable degree of
community of destiny. Solemn though the idea may he, it is simply true. Yet the question is that such past
and present community of destiny shared by most Europeans niav cease to exist over the next decades. Fa-
ced with cosmopolitanism, mass immigration from the rest of the world. the relentless spread of the mass
media, telecommunications, global interdependence, demographic and ecological imbalances, world trade
and industry, transnational social inequalities and such like, European culture may hecome even store blu-
rred in its features than it is now, until it loses all its remaining distinctiveness; more blurred, not becau-
se confronted with an alien culture, but because also confronted with its very own, in the shape of' its own
ramifications and consequences, as re-cast. perfected or transformed by the peoples who, once upon it ti-
me, fell under its spell or were the direct offshoots of its relentless world expansion.
* k *
Curiously enough, these developments which some would without hesitation call threats- are taking
place precisely at the historical juncture when the process of political, cultural and economic unification in the
European continent finally gathers momentum, and when many historical undercurrents and ,social trends le-
ading towards the eventual rise of one ,single European society are finally coming to the surface. Here is the
paradox: the possible end of Europe as it distinct civilisation takes place during the advent of Europe as a po-
litical, economic and transnational unit. However, in as far as the preoccupations and diagnoses of intellec-
tuals and social scientists can he considered an indication of trend,, to come in the life of a culture, it does lo-
ok as though Europe will survixe. as a unique civilisation, faithful to its chief traditions, in the near future.
All too often we hear that social scientists tend to notice and react to events only when they have co-
me to fruition or, if' such events pose sonic sort of threat, only when it is already too late for anyone to do
anything that may put a stop to their pernicious development. Although sonic of it,, may think that gathe-
rings such as our,, ought to have taken place at much earlier date, thus anticipating the future turn of cxents,
it seems to me that the familiar harsh judgement about the social scientists' supposed lack of awareness
about certain crucial social processes is. in the case of Europe, notoriously unfair. If it is true that, for the
most part, European social scientists have preferred to work within the framework of their national socie-
tes -which appeared more easily accessible for them as clearly-hound units of observation, and for which
statistical material, linguistic unity and already gathered data and research funds were more readily avai-
lable- it is also true that many among them have long been engaged in work of a truly European scope.
A « F.uropean vision" and a European standpoint have not been absent in the recent past from the pre-
occupations of many of our colleagues. Trans-European migrations, economic integration, the rise of
Community law, t ansnational Social inequality. welfare state provisions throughout Western Europe. the
consolidation of democracy in entire regions of the continent, the fluctuations of the labour market and the
nature of industrial conflict in different countries, as well as many other trends, have been amply and of-
ten successfully analysed across Europe, or across substantial parts of Europe. by social scientists for qui-
te a long time. For their part, European studies institutes have proliferated and are to he found today in
many university caunpuses and elsewhere. Moreover, many inter-university programmes, such as Erasmus.
are now being intensively used by young and budding social scientists in many parts of the continent. Me-
anxvhilc. political, economic and cultural history has been steadily losing its former nationalistic underto-
nes. European historians have been recovering all too slowly in some cases- from the nationalistic bias
imposed upon them by the demands of their respective nation states and the cultural assumptions of the
inherited ethnic romanticism, ethnocentrism and particularism in xxhick many of them were once steeped.
These hindrances notwithstanding. universalism as an attitude of' the enlightened mind, and the me-
thodological imperative of studying mankind rather than one of' its many tribes in not -so- splendid isola-
tion, has never left the Social science disciplines as cultivated by Europeans: after all, both these approa-
40
chc, to reality were horn and hied here. as essential components of our cultural tradition, thouE'h. by de-
finition, no monopoly upon them can ever he exercised by a single nation. school or methodological ap-
proach. Rationality. Science. humanism and respect for empirical proof are only in a historical Sense defi-
ning traits of our civilisation. They have always been highly exportable commodities and have nos spre-
ad well heyond the countries directly peopled by the European emigrants and colonizers of the past.
The uneven political development of Western Europe, where the formation of one single democratic
territorial continuum has been a very slow process indeed -lasting from 1945. when the totalitarian regi-
mes fell in Italy and Germany, until 1974, when Portugal. Greece and Spain began their transitions to li-
beral democracy has been a serious hindrance for the grosth of what one may Strictly call a common I :u-
ropeun consciousness. For its part. the Eastern half of the continent was suddenly and forcibly cut off from
the rest of it in the name of an ideology which was, interestingly but unfortunately, largely based on the
awful distortion of specifically European traditions of equality. emancipation. Solidarity and progress. With
the collapse of the Stalinist dictatorships and police states in the Gast from 191)5 to 1992, some of the pre-
requisites for further unification have been achieved. Despite tensions and continued confrontations -par-
ticularly in the Balkans - a space and framework that does not exclude any part of our continent from par-
ticipating in our common endeavour as a civilisation is beginning to take shape. though there is Still it long
slay to go. Yet the feeling sonic have that a truly united Europe is suddenly and finally within our grasp
is wholly justified. There is no longer any reason whatsoever for us not to meet and work together across
national holder,, as members of one single and larger community within our shared universe of discourse.
S * S:
There is if widespread feeling today that Europe has, quite unexpectedly, materialised before our own
eyes. By common accord , Europe was, before, a mere geographical expression , whose shared cultural fe-
atures sere never strong enough to make into a real unit. Yet , an awareness of its deeper and substantial
cohesion despite its often tragic inner cleavages and confrontations has been strong among many of its
scholars in our times. Weber , Sinrncl , Pareto, and Freud are early representatives of such contemporary
awareness. After them , from Karl Mannheim to Raymond Aron and Norbert Elias the unitary approach has
made its voice heard . Some important structures may have differed from society to society and, certainly,
political and economic developments have diverged or collided with each other, but Europe, both as a Sin-
gle civilisation and culture and as it community of destiny fix its various peoples, was a fact of life A fact,
however . apparently contradicted by the hitter confrontations of politics, war or ideology . Often enough,
though these sere a s considerable within nations IS hetween them, almost none could he circumscribed to
one single society . Such confrontations , however , have now undergone it severe attenuation over the last
I ew decades . C onsequently . during the very recent past, the process of political, economic and cultural
unity has gathered sufficient speed to force a substantial number of intellectuals and social scientists to ad-
dress themselves to the implications of the rise of one single society , one single polity and one single eco-
nomy within Europe. Among such implications we must count some which are of a somewhat theoretical
nature. AS, in their case, theory matters , I shall refer to them here.
The "con verge nec/dr verge rice '> issue is one paramount theoretical problem that descryes some atten-
tion, for its presence within our discourse has immediate consequences for the kind of practical attitudes
we display. Put very simply , it refers to the confluence ( or otherwise ) of our several societies into one sin-
gle society. By the same token , and in the kind of world we now live in, the issue refers also to our pos-
sihle confluence (or otherwise) sith the societies around our',,, or with those with which sc maintain clo-
se links, he they of mutual dependence or, as some would Still put it, of the centre-periphery kind.
This is not the place for a discussion of the debate (often heated ) that has surrounded the issue over
the last decade,,. Suffice to say that traditional theories of modernisation ( theories, for instance , of indus-
trialisation , or of the irresistible worldspread of the capitalist node of production) tended to assume a pro-
gressive ( if often unsteady ) convergence of all societies that fell under the ,Western dynamics>> or civili-
sational pattern . Some of these theories went even further than that. Such was the notorious case of the
-industrial man- theory , which posited the rise of one human type whose predominant presence was con-
comitant sith that of all advanced industrial societies, regardless of certain other traits, Such as national
traditions and local moral or religious values , or the once all-important divide hetween state Socialism and
Western capitalism. The industrial man, thesis, together with certain notions about it supposedly neces-
sary attitudinal complex made up of individualism , a thirst for personal achievement , and other ( essentially
41
\Vcstem) :uuhropoloeical traits. hrought psychological interpretations into the picture. The notion of an
incvitable convergence of all European, and by extension. Western, societies, under the ever-expanding lo-
gic of industrialism, capitalism and achieving individualists thus became popular at the macro, micro, and
individual feyci . under continued modernisation, the rest of the world might follow.
Serious criticism of these assumptions (the height of whose popularity may he situated in the fifties
and sixties in the United States and in some North-Western European countries) came first from those Mar-
xist or neo-Marxist scholars who developed various theories of « uneven development.), "dependent deve-
lopnient", the capitalist world system, and such like. For their part, however, many non-Marxist antliro-
pologists and sociologists of several persuasions also seriously questioned the universal convergence the-
sis. In the case of Europe, the growth of intra-European comparative analysis at class, economic and
political levels from the mid-sixties onwards, showed the east disparities that existed between societies and
also Aithin societies. Italian social scientists, for instance. were quick to insist not only on the persistence
-under conditions of economic growth- of the North-South divide in their own country, but on the actual
increase of traditional or new national disparities. Comparative research across Europe also showed that,
due to migrations. different state policies, ethnic loyalties, and other factors, no undifferentiated single so-
ciety could he said to he rising in Europe despite moves towards a common market and greater political
unity. For some time it looked as though the old convergence,, thesis had become untenable, even wi-
thin the space of a small continent with the characteristics of ours. Suddenly the assertion of progressive
convergence seemed naive. even unintelligent.
The advent of 1993 and what it means in terms of' real European integration seems a good reason to
grant both positions the con ergence and the divergence theories- their due. For one thing, there has ari-
sen a broad commonality of conditions throughout many parts of Europe. Thus, the arrival of mass af-
fluence and the expansion of the welfare state (often enough under the aegis of socialist or socialdemo-
cratic policies) has reduced the salience of class as the most crucial component of social conflict and po-
litical alignment in several countries. In the same countries, the logic of industrialism has certainly not
aholished social classes. ()n the contrary, in conjunction with the dynamics of capitalism, it has produced
nest kinds of poverty and loss of privilege, as the ,several cases of dc-industrialisation abundantly prove.
Yet it leads towards an entirely new set of problems, wholly shared by most European nations, albeit in
differing degrees. Likewise, though many social trends vary from country to country or region to region
-population grovsth, immigration flows, economic development, the demands of ethnicity, etcetera others.
such as the development of a technological culture, the spread of corporate power, the increase in Euro-
pean-wide institutions and in stable interactions at all conceivable levels-must he leading towards a subs-
tantial measure of consolidated convergence. These latter trends may, again, be far from homogenous, but
only the most obstinate (anticonvergence,, observer will assert their irrelevance to the rise of a relatively
unified and distinct society that can, without unduly ideological distortion, he called Europe.
Convergence is not uniformity. We ought to be able to assume the ambivalence and the complexities
of our situation in respect to the varieties of the economic, political and cultural dimensions of Europe whi-
Ie taking into account the strong common elements that make integration possible and even necessary. For
one thing. convergence is not a figment of anyone's imagination or ideological wishful thinking: it is ob-
vious that many European societies have either become relatively stable liberal democracies or are in the
(often painful) process of moving in the direction of pluralistic parliamentarianism, constitutionalism and
human and citizen's rights. Effective moves towards political, monetary, tariff and market unity have ke-
en taking place since the 1958 'meaty of Rome and will reach a historical peak when 1992 conies to a clo-
se. Relatively similar welfare state policies, juridical guarantees, higher education curricula and many o-
ther provisions arise everywhere. The European Social Charter and the social policy progrannnes of the
Community will encounter difficulties in their application, but they exist and will he implemented. For
another structural differentiation between countries and regions continues to he strong. Not only distincti-
ve inherited structures persist. New ones also arise. To give just one glaring example, immigration from
the "outer, societies seems to affect each of the host countries differently. Great Britain has received im-
migrants from India, Pakistan and the Caribbean; Spain from North and Western Africa and Latin Ameri-
ca; France from Algeria and other parts of Africa; Germany from Turkey; the Netherlands from Indone-
sia; not to speak of the internal European migrations from South to North that preceded the current influx,
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or the ssasc of ntignmts, now just he'-'Lill, front the European East, that also affects each Western I'.urupe
an society differently. Each country has received or receives its immigrant component from different are-
as, cultures and religions and in vastly varying numbers. Some, like Portugal, have assimilated great nun)-
hers of immigrants in a rather exemplary manner, worthy of the best European traditions of tolerance and
respect for any foreign citizen. Others have been or are being) less faithful to our alleged moral codes of
public conduct. Whatever the s iess s vse nmv espress on the matter, it is clear that there is. on the one hand,
a Europe in the making and, on the other, a Europe in the «unmakin->'. There is consergence, but there is
also disergence. fragmentation, centrifugal tendencies. A general move towards innerI'.uropean cosmo-
politanism is frequently challenged by the hostility of sectorial, state or regional interests. Ethnic conflicts
still Hare up and take their awful toll. Meanwhile, of course, the transformation of our own position wi-
thin the world at large continues to take place.
It is in the light of these simultaneous currents and countercurrents. of this essentially shitting and
ambivalent situation, that European citizens must look at the structure and dynamics of their continent to-
day. Unless we look at Europe from that perspective, more as a bundle of tensions and uncertainties than
as a smooth process moving towards some marginal plenitude. we shall betray our best traditions of criti-
cal thought. 'Ihe loss of irony about ourselves, our countries and our beliefs has plunged us in the past in-
to awful conflicts against each other. Let us hope that we do not lose it again. Nor that tragic sense of li-
fe which has been the most characteristic trait of our culture through the ages. Let us-hope that the new
k:urope nose emerging will continue to live by reason as scelI as by a sense of tragedy tempered ssith irons.
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